It was suggested that the fair hearing rule is broad enough to include the rule against bias, as a fair hearing must be an impartial hearing. However, rules are often treated separately. It is essential for a fair trial that both parties be heard. : 402 The right to a fair trial presupposes that individuals are not prejudiced by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations, unless they have had a fair opportunity to respond and the opportunity to present their own arguments before cases against them.  Allegations of bias based on financial interests must now be decided on a more reasonable basis than was the case with the automatic exclusion. Although the court ultimately decides whether the link between interest and apprehension of bias can be articulated to a relevant extent, the parties can now bear a heavier burden. A party cannot rely simply on the “mere assertion” of a financial interest. A party that does not express, or at least cannot articulate, or at least cannot substantiate, the connection between the interest and the resulting fear risks having the objection rejected as a “mere claim”.  In Kanda v. Government of Malaysia, the Court held that the opinion must state directly and clearly the question of bias, facts and circumstances to be addressed. It is one of the rights of the individual to defend himself, so he must be familiar with the relevant issue so that he can contradict the statement and protect himself. The first is the “hearing rule,” which states that the person or party affected by the Expert Panel`s decision should have a fair opportunity to present their views in order to defend themselves. Public confidence as the basis of the rule against bias is also expressed in the oft-quoted words of Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that “it is not only of some importance, but also fundamental that justice should not only be done, but should obviously be regarded as done”.
 The judicial approach is unanimous and decided that any financial interest, however small, would prejudice administrative measures. The non-participation of the biased member in the proceedings will not be prevented if he was present. The problem of ministerial bias is very common in any administrative process and is not effectively addressed, and at every small interval it leads to a negative concept of fairness that disappears into the process. As the bias rule has been extended to a large number of policymakers, it has also become more flexible. The courts have repeatedly emphasized that the bias rule must take into account the specificities of the decision-maker and the broader environment to which it applies. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that “the contextual nature of the duty of impartiality” allows it to “vary to reflect the context of a decision-maker`s activities and the nature of his or her duties.”  There are many similar court decisions emphasizing that the bias rule is context-sensitive.  At the same time, however, the courts have introduced a single test for determining allegations of bias – that of the fair and informed observer.  This fictitious person provides a means in which courts can impart as little or as much knowledge as necessary to provide context. In many cases, the courts provide the fair and informed observer with remarkably detailed knowledge and considerable understanding and acceptance of decision-making. This approach raises the question  of whether the honest and informed person is a neutral observer or somewhat more than the disguised court. A committee, “Ministerial Authority”, gave 3 essential procedures related to the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court has stated that obtaining a reasonable and justified judgment is the objective of judicial and administrative bodies.
The primary purpose of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice. Natural justice allows a person to exercise his or her right to reasonable notice of the date, time and place of the hearing, as well as detailed notice of the matter to be satisfied.  This information gives the individual sufficient time to effectively prepare his or her own case and respond to the complaint against him. In Cooper v. Wandsworth, Chief Justice William Erle went so far as to state that Cooper`s failure to give notice and hear could be described as a form of abuse, since he had been treated as if he had played no role.  As Lord Mustill stated in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Doody (1993): “Since the person concerned cannot usually make valid submissions without knowing what factors may weigh against his or her interests, fairness will very often require that he or she be informed of the substance of the matter to be answered.”  : 582  Day v Savadge  EngR 643; (1614) Hob 65; 80 ER 235 to 235. In this case, a trespassing lawsuit was heard by the city officials against whom the lawsuit was filed.
The decision was overturned due to the inherent conflict facing city officials. The problem of “ministerial bias” is inherent in administrative procedure, and if not effectively controlled, it can negate the concept of fairness in administrative procedure. The reason for the cancellation of the notification, according to the Supreme Court, was the conflict between the duty and interest of the Ministry and the consequent erosion of public confidence in administrative justice. The High Court of Australia took a very different view in Ebner v Official Trustee when considering two joint appeals involving judges who held relatively small shareholdings in a bank party to proceedings presided over by the judge. The High Court could have decided any case on the basis of a minor exception to automatic disqualification.  Rather, the majority of the Court found that there was no separate automatic exclusion rule where a judge had a direct financial interest in a party to a proceeding over which he or she presided.  The majority essentially reinterpreted Dimes by stating that, on closer reading, this case did not warrant automatic exclusion.  The majority also rejected the suggestion that financial and other interests could or should be treated differently or that they should automatically result in staff disqualification.
Gleeson, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. stated: If an arbitrator or judge has a monetary or economic interest in the subject matter of the dispute or case, it is called financial bias. When deciding a case, the judge must be free of any financial or commercial interest. In other words, a person`s financial interest in the subject matter of the case disqualifies him or her from being a judge. “. First, identify all the circumstances relevant to the judge`s presumption of bias. Natural justice simply means establishing a reasonable decision-making process on a particular issue. Sometimes it doesn`t matter what the reasonable decision is, but at the end of the day, it`s the procedure that counts and who is involved in making the reasonable decision.
It is not limited to the concept of “fairness”, it has different colors and shades that vary depending on the context.  Ibid., p. . A formula similar to that developed by Kirby J. was adopted a few years earlier in RDS v. R  3 SCR 484 at , where L`Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ. suggested that bias “should be assessed from the perspective of the reasonable, informed, practical and realistic person examining the issue in detail. The candidate is not a “very sensitive or conscientious” person, but a fair person who knows the circumstances of the case.  Bahadur v Secretary for Security  2 HKLRD 113 (accepting that the bias rule applies to administrative decisions of the Minister of Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region).